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Abstract
The article builds on Ishiyama’s (1998) seminal study of Communist successor parties
[Ishiyama, J.T., 1998. Strange bedfellows: explaining political cooperation between communist
successor parties and nationalists in Eastern Europe. Nations and Nationalism 4(1), 61e85] by
providing the ﬁrst comparative study of the fate of Communist successor parties in Eurasia
and Central-Eastern Europe. The article outlines four paths undertaken by Communist parties
in former Communist states: those countries that rapidly transformed Communist parties into
center-left parties; countries that were slower at achieving this; countries with imperial
legacies; and Eurasian autocracies. The fate of successor Communist parties is discussed
within the parameters of previous regime type, political opposition in the Communist era and
the nationality question.
 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.
Keywords: Communist successor party; Socialist party; Centrists; Nationalism; Dissent and opposition;
USSR; YugoslaviaThe diﬀerent Communist party legacies in Central-Eastern Europe and the CIS
have been the subject of few scholarly studies because scholars have rarely
undertaken comparative studies in political processes between the outer and inner
Soviet empires. The purpose of this analysis is to build on Ishiyama’s (1998) and0967-067X/$ - see frontmatter 2008Published byElsevier Ltd on behalf of TheRegents of theUniversity ofCalifornia.
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successor parties. The collection brings together seven contributions, covering two
rapidly reforming countries (Poland and Lithuania1), four reform laggards (Slo-
vakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and one reform laggard from the Common-
wealth of Independent States, or CIS, Ukraine. This comparative introduction to
the special issue surveys post-Communist party legacies and presents a new
framework that reveals a wide variation across the standard geographic divide
between the inner and outer Soviet empires. This article divides post-Communist
states into four groups based upon political regime characteristics: Central-Eastern
European democracies (rapid reformers), Central-Eastern European semi-democ-
racies (reform laggards), Post-imperial pseudo-democracies/autocracies (reform
obstructionists) and Eurasian autocracies (reform stiﬂers). This division of coun-
tries is drawn up through a survey and discussion of seven factors: the post-
Communist transition, type of dominant nationalism, successor parties, the
popularity of nationalist parties, attitudes towards national minorities, the strength
of dissidents and the opposition in the Communist era and attitudes towards
foreign policy orientations.
The weakness of comparative studies of the inner and outer Soviet empires is
evident in the realm of dissent and opposition. Ukraine and Georgia had larger
national-democratic opposition than any of the Central-Eastern European Semi-
Democratic reform laggards, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia or Croatia.
Central-Eastern European Semi-Democratic reform laggards, Romania and Bulga-
ria, have more in common with the successful democratizers of the CIS, Ukraine and
Georgia, than with the Central-Eastern European Democratic rapid reformers:
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the three Baltic states. If a comparison is
undertaken of the inner and outer empires that takes into account the positive
inﬂuence of the EU membership ‘carrot’, and the lack of such an oﬀer extended by
the EU to any CIS state, Ukraine’s and Georgia’s democratic progress is remark-
able. Bulgaria and Romania signed Europe Agreements with the EU in 1993 but
began their real transitions only after EU membership was oﬀered to them in 1999.
During their ﬁrst post-Communist decade Bulgaria’s and Romania’s transitions had
been hijacked, as in Ukraine and Georgia, by post-Communist successor Socialist or
‘‘centrist’’ parties. The Romanian and Bulgarian successor Communist parties
meaningfully evolved into center-left parties only in the 1ate 1990s, after their
electoral defeat in 1996 and 1997. Bulgaria and Romania were recognized as market
economies by the EU in 2002 and 2004, or 3 and 1 years respectively before
Ukraine’s recognition in 2005. Romania and Bulgaria became market economies
after they had been granted EU membership, while Ukraine became a market
economy in the absence of EU membership prospects.
The collapse of Communist party rule in Central-Eastern Europe did not lead to
a uniform transition of ruling Communist parties into successor parties. There is1 Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia are also Central-Eastern European Democratic
rapid reformers but they are not surveyed in the seven country case studies included in this special issue.
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Eastern Europe and within Central-Eastern Europe. Within the CIS there is
a greater uniformity than within Central-Eastern Europe in the types of successor
parties that have evolved. Communist successor parties in the three Baltic states have
evolved along the lines similar to Central-Eastern Europe rather than in other former
Soviet republics. In another two former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Georgia, the
evolution of Communist successor parties have straddled the divide between
Central-Eastern Europe and the CIS. Five of the 15 Soviet republics, therefore, have
characteristics that either closely follow the Central-Eastern pattern (the three Baltic
states) or resemble it to a large degree (Ukraine and Georgia).
This article builds on Ishiyama’s (1998) framework that divided 27 post-
Communist states into Patrimonial, Bureaucratic-Authoritarian and National
Consensus regimes. Patrimonial states had low levels of elite contestation and popular
interest in politics, were infused with rational-bureaucratic professionalization and
included a high degree of democratic centralism. Ishiyama (1998) incorporates Serbia,
Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the remainder of the CIS within the
Patrimonial group giving the group an unwieldy and wide variety of states, regime
types and successor Communist parties. Russia and Serbia, both centers of multi-
national states, have nevertheless diﬀerent characteristics. Bulgaria, Romania and
Ukraine have some similarities while the group fails to include Georgia.
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian group permitted some degree of elite contesta-
tion and interest articulation within a highly rational-bureaucratic institutional
setting. The GDR, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are given by Ishiyama (1998) as
examples of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian states. While the GDR and the Czech
Republic have many similarities, Slovakia would present a problem to ﬁt in this
group. National Consensus post-Communist states, such as Poland, Hungary,
Slovenia, Croatia and the three Baltic states, permitted a wide degree of elite
contestation and interest articulation. While Poland, Hungary and Slovenia have
much in common, the inclusion of Croatia and the three Baltic states within the
National Consensus group is challenged in this article. Political opposition and
dissent in Croatia and the Baltic states were inter-related, so far as national-
democratic dissidents espoused support for human rights and positive resolution of
the national question. The authoritarian Yugoslav regime was very diﬀerent from
the totalitarian Soviet system that embarked on an uneven process of liberalization
during Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost (1985e1991).
Within the three Baltic states the transition of Lithuania’s successor Communist
party most closely resembled that of Poland and Hungary. Although Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia were incorporated together into the USSR during World War II,
they had diﬀerent proportions of national minorities. In Lithuania, national
minorities made up 16 percent of the population, primarily Poles and Russians, while
Russian-speaking minorities comprised half of Latvia’s and a third of Estonia’s
populations. Only Lithuania followed the remainder of the USSR in introducing
inclusive citizenship requirements for its population, while Estonia and Latvia
adopted ethnic citizenship requirements similar to those in place in Germany until
1999.
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party in Central-Eastern Europe is the Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP). The
MSZP became the ﬁrst successful Communist party to transform itself into a post-
Communist European center-left party by drawing on the ideological ﬂexibility of
the Janos Kadar regime (1956e1989) and the large body of pro-reform intellectuals
within the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. These intellectuals and cadres
provided the MSZP with the organizational skills, political expertise and intellectual
resources to re-build a center-left successor party. With limited competition on the
left the MSZP has dominated Hungary’s political spectrum. In the absence of
a national minority problem, Hungarian irredentism was not adopted by any
mainstream political force. Hence, the MSZP has never sought an alliance with
Hungary’s marginal nationalist parties and has not, therefore, espoused nationalist
slogans. ‘‘Since national minorities never posed a real threat to national unity, the
regime never attempted to systematically assimilate them.’’ (Chen, 2007, p. 178).
Previous regime type
As Ishiyama (1998) pointed out, previous regime type was undoubtedly a crucial
factor in determining the type of successor Communist parties. The majority of
former Communist parties in Central-Eastern Europe have transformed themselves
into Socialist and Social-Democratic parties and all Central-Eastern European
Communist parties are full members of the Socialist International. The only
exception in the CIS is Ukraine whose Socialist party (SPU), a center-left successor
party to the pre-1991 Communist party, joined the Socialist International in 2003.
The SPU was established in the fall of 1991 after the Communist party of Ukraine
(KPU) was banned following the collapse of the hard line putsch in Moscow in
August 1991. The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine united (SDPUo) was refused
membership of the Socialist International because of its ties to oligarchic groups. In
other CIS states successor Communist parties have associate member status in the
Socialist International.
The regime type clearly had a direct impact on the ability of Poland and Hungary
to rapidly reform. In both countries, as Jasiewicz points out in his study of Poland
for this special issue, the liberal Communist regime and mono-ethnic composition of
the country permitted a rapid transition from Communist to Social-Democratic
party. Clark and Praneviciute’s contribution on Lithuania shows how its Communist
party became the fastest example of a Communist party transforming itself into
a Socialist party in the former USSR. In Czechoslovakia reform progressed faster in
the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of the repressive post-1968
Communist regime led to the emergence of a hard-line successor Communist party in
the Czech Republic and, as shown in the Rybar and Deegan-Krause’s contribution,
a slow evolution of the Communist party in Slovakia. The articles by Pop-Eleches
and Spirova show how the popularity and repressive legacies of communism in
Bulgaria and Romania imparted a path dependence that led to a very slow evolution
from Communist to Social-Democratic parties. Only in the late 1990s did this
transition result in signiﬁcant internal changes in the Romanian and Bulgarian
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liberal Yugoslav Communist regime failed to produce a rapid transition to
a successor party due to the nationality question. With Croatia embroiled in a war of
independence and dominated by nationalists until 1999 the left and liberals could
only emerge as an alternative political force in the 2000 and subsequent elections.
The post-Soviet political landscape of the CIS was dominated by ruling parties
composed of ideologically amorphous ‘centrist’ parties that have emerged as ‘kryshy’
(criminal slang for political roofs) for big business, ruling elites and regional clans.
Surviving Communist parties and center-left splinter successor parties, such as the
SPU, were largely unsuccessful at winning electoral majorities in the ﬁrst decade of
post-Communism, despite an acute socio-economic crisis throughout the CIS.
Moldova was the exception where the Communist party (PCRM) returned to power
in 2001 and 2005 in free and fair elections giving it a parliamentary majority.
Following the establishment of a parliamentary constitution the Communist
majority was able to elect its leader as the country’s president in 2001 and 2005.
Ishiyama’s (1998) suggestion that economic crises was one causal factor in
mobilizing popular support for the extreme left and right who together could enter
into an unholy alliance has not been borne out in the CIS. Ukraine experienced one
of the worst collapses in its economy in the former USSR and only resumed
economic growth in 2000. Despite the acute socio-economic crisis in 1989e1999 the
KPU, a new party legalized in 1993,2 failed to win the presidency in the 1994 or 1999
elections and never obtained a parliamentary majority. The KPU obtained its
highest portion of parliamentary seats in the 1998e2002 parliament with 120 (out of
450) seats but then entered into a period of rapid decline. Chen (2007, p. 213) points
out that there is no hard and fast rule on the impact of economic downturns on
successor Communist party support or even that of the role of nationalism in these
successor parties. With one of the worst economic downturns of the 15 Soviet
republics, Ukraine’s KPU never won power while extreme right nationalists failed to
gain any support at the ballot box. Post-Communist nationalism can grow both
during economic downturns as well as during periods of high economic growth, as in
Russia since 2000 and in China.
Ishiyama (1998) erroneously includes Belarus as an example of a country where the
extreme left and right have cooperated in a Communist-nationalist alliance. The
Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime has many attributes that are neo-Soviet but what
distinguishes it from other post-Communist states is the absence of a ruling party of
power. The regime is built on a highly personalized Sultantistic paternalism where
parties have been superﬂuous. The autocratic Lukashenka regime has not followed the
patterns established in other CIS states where the former Communist senior nomen-
klatura have established ‘‘centrist’’ ruling parties into which they have cajoled the ruling2 The KPU was not legalized as a successor party to the Communist Party in Ukraine that was banned
in August 1991 because to have done so would have permitted the KPU to lay claim to state property
controlled by the Communist Party until its ban. KPU property was nationalized by the Ukrainian state
after the ban. Ukraine therefore has de jure no successor Communist Party. The new KPU was registered
in October 1993.
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Communists (PKB) which is allied with the anti-Lukashenka opposition and the loyal
pro-Lukashenka Communist Party of Belarus (KPB). Both successor parties align with
diﬀerent types of nationalist groups and parties, the PKB with the pro-Western (civic
nationalist) opposition and the KPB with pan-Slavic Russophile parties and the
Lukashenka regime.
In Ukraine Zimmer and Haran traced the growth of ‘‘centrist’’ parties in the post-
Soviet period. The SPU aligned itself with Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko
bloc during the anti-regime protests of 2002e2003 and also in the 2004 elections and
Orange Revolution. The KPU and pan-Slavic groups supported the Kuchma regi-
me’s candidate, Prime Minister and Party of Regions leader, Viktor Yanukovych.
Russia provides a good example of failed parties of power during its democratic
experiment in the 1990s. The creation of a highly successful party of power only took
place after an authoritarian regime was established under Vladimir Putin who was
elected President in March 2000 (after becoming acting president on December 31,
1999). During Borys Yeltsin’s decade-long presidency (1990e1999) two attempts at
establishing parties of power, Russia’s Choice andOurHome is Russia, failed. A post-
Communist alliance of the extreme right and left proved possible in Russia, as it did in
Serbia and Romania. The Communist party (KPRF) and other extreme left and
extreme right nationalist parties were able to successfully draw on the organizational
skills of the Soviet era Communist party. Unlike in Serbia, also the center of a multi-
national Yugoslav state, Russia’s successor Communist parties were hampered in their
development by the lack of a Russian Communist party throughout the USSR’s
70 year history, except for 1990e1991. The Russian SFSR had no republican insti-
tutions of its own until after it declared sovereignty in June 1990, only 18 months
before the USSR disintegrated. Within Yugoslavia the Socialist Republic of Serbia
had its own Communist party (that transmuted into the Socialist Party), secret police
(UDBA), Academy of Sciences and Young Communist League (Kuzio, 2007).
Putin has been far more successful in establishing a ruling party of power within
an autocratic regime, ﬁrst through the Unity party that came to power in 2000 and
then through Uniﬁed Russia created from the merger of Unity and Yuriy Luzhkov’s
and Yevgenny Primakov’s Fatherland-All Russia Party. Prime Minister Putin was
elected head of Uniﬁed Russia in April 2008. Similar ‘centrist’ ruling parties of
power were successfully created in other autocratic CIS states, such as in Azerbaijan
and in Central Asia. Attempts to establish ruling parties of power failed in semi-
democratic Russia under Yeltsin (Russia’s Choice, Our Home is Russia), Ukraine’s
competitive authoritarian regime (People’s Democratic Party [NDP], For a United
Ukraine) under Leonid Kuchma and Georgia’s failed state (Union of Citizens of
Georgia) under Eduard Shevardnadze.
Nationality question
Nationalism is not necessarily antithetical to liberal democracies and market
economies and although Western democracies are routinely mislabeled as ‘‘civic’’ in
reality a pure civic state is a myth (Kuzio, 2002). Liberal democratic universalism has
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cores. Civic nationalism is therefore central to the cohesiveness of liberal
democracies.
Four types of nationalism have emerged in post-Communist Europe e civic,
ethnic, Soviet and great power e of which only civic nationalism has supported
democratic transitions and Euro-Atlantic integration. The type of nationalism that
eventually emerged in the transition from Communism drew on the Leninist era and
the pre-Communist past. Russia, Serbia and Romania experienced the greatest
fusion of Communism and nationalism and great power and ethnic nationalism has
therefore remained popular in the post-Communist era in all three countries (Chen,
2007). In Belarus, a far stronger Soviet type nationalism has ruled the country since
1994, the year Lukashenka was elected in a free election, in competition with
a weaker pro-Western Belarusian civic nationalism (Leshchenko, 2004). Great power
Russian, ethnic and Soviet nationalisms are incompatible with liberal democracies
and in countries where these nationalisms have become dominant the resultant
regimes have become authoritarian. These regimes, particularly in the CIS (Russia,
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), support integration within
the CIS, instead of Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine and Georgia prioritized
Euro-Atlantic integration, downplayed CIS integration and led the GUAM (Geor-
gia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) pro-Western regional group. Ukraine’s
successor parties on the left and in the center, as Zimmer and Haran in this special
issue show, have not followed the evolution of former Communist parties in Central-
Eastern Europe towards support for Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine is the only
country to seek NATO membership where the left is opposed to this goal. In other
aspirant NATO members, such as Spain, Romania and Bulgaria, the left’s initial
opposition evolved into support for NATO membership.3
The more the Communist regime attempted to transform Leninism into an
integral component of a country’s national identity, the greater there would be
diﬃculties in establishing a post-Leninist liberal democracy (Chen, 2007). Of Chen’s
(2007) four country case studies, he found the greatest fusion of Leninism and
nationalism to have taken place in Russia where there was a profound dominance of
illiberal nationalism. Russia’s relationship to the USSR was diﬀerent to that between
Serbia and Yugoslavia in that Russia never possessed republican institutions (except
for a brief period in 1990e1991) and Russian and Soviet identities were, therefore,
closely inter-woven. In addition, the Russian SFSR, unlike Serbia, never possessed
a nation-state prior to entering a multi-national state. The USSR was the homeland
for ethnic Russians while non-Russians had two loyalties: the USSR and republics
where they were the titular ethnic group. Throughout the 1990s great power
nationalism in Russia spread from the extreme left and right to the democratic
spectrum and during Putin’s presidency it became a ruling ideology assisted by
a revival of Soviet political culture. Chen (2007, 92) concluded that: ‘‘successful
liberal nationalism in Russia remains a remote scenario.’’ In the ﬁrst half of the3 Initially anti-NATO Spanish Socialist Xavier Solana went on to become NATO General Secretary.
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Front red-brown coalition. Under Putin Uniﬁed Russia has built alliances with
extreme left and right nationalists in the Liberal Democratic party and Rodina
(Motherland).
Outside Russia, similar extreme left-right coalitions only appeared in Romania
between the Social Democrats and the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party
of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and in Serbia between the Socialist and
Radical parties. The extreme left in the non-Russian republics of the CIS continued
to remain as unreformed Marxist parties loyal to the USSR. The two exceptions in
Central-Eastern Europe were in the Czech Republic and Germany where it is an
outgrowth of the GDR’s legacy. Following the departure of 95 percent of its pre-
1991 membership, the new post-1993 KPU remained an ossiﬁed neo-Stalinist party.
Of the Soviet successor Communist parties only the KPRF integrated nationalism
with Leninism to espouse a great power Soviet Russian nationalism.
Romania is an additional case study employed by Chen (2007) to analyze the
close fusion of Leninism and nationalism. The integration of nationalism and
Leninism is discussed in Spirova and Pop-Eleches studies of Bulgaria and Romania.
Romania’s unﬂinching ‘‘national Stalinism’’ co-opted intellectuals and the Orthodox
Church and blocked both the emergence of a reform wing within the Communist
party and an anti-Communist opposition. Nationalism in Russia, Serbia, Romania
and Bulgaria supported the Communist regime, a factor that limited the emergence
of pro-Western national democratic (civic nationalist) alternatives. In Romania,
‘‘nationalism could not play a role in the criticism of the regime as it did in other
Communist countries, since by the mid-1970s the nationalist discourse was entirely
monopolised by the regime itself.’’ (Petrescu, 2004, p. 154). ‘‘National Stalinism’’ did
not recognize the legitimacy of Hungarian minority rights which were increasingly
subject to ‘‘the obliteration of minority identities and the assimilation of ethnic
minorities into one socialist nation’’ (Chen, 2003, p. 192). In the 1990s in Romania
the successor Communist party was intolerant of the opposition, instigated violence
by coal miners against the non-Communist opposition and aligned itself with the
extreme right. Conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism and anti-Western and anti-
Hungarian xenophobia in Romania had resembled conspiracy theories that were
commonplace in Russia and both had historical and Leninist roots. Support at 33
percent in the 2000 presidential elections for Greater Romania Party leader Corneliu
V. Tudor ensured that he entered the second round and the 20 percent of the vote for
the Greater Romania Party was only surpassed on the extreme right in post-
Communist Europe and Eurasia by the support given by Serbian voters to the
Radical Party. Nationalism in Romania became so central to the Communist party
under Ceausescu that it ultimately undermined it (Chen, 2003, p. 190, 2007, p. 149).
In Bulgaria the growth of nationalism within the Communist party, ‘‘was part of
the adaptation of the power elite to the ﬁrst serious signs of the de-legitimisation of
Communism. Nationalism was a strategy of self-justiﬁcation’’ (Petrova, 2004,
p. 179). In the 1980s Communist party policies directed against the Turkish minority
forced many Bulgarian Turks to emigrate to Turkey and for those who opted to stay
to change their names. As Spirova shows, during the 1990s the successor Socialist
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popular mass mobilization. The exception is the recent phenomenon of the anti-
Turkish National Union Attack (NSA) coalition’s success in the 2005 elections that
drew nationalist voters away from the Socialist party. The success of the NSA
showed the degree to which nationalist sentiment had coalesced within the Bulgarian
successor Communist party as much as it had in Communist successor parties in
Romania, Serbia and Russia.
The Liberal Democratic Party (the Belarusian branch of the infamous Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia) and the Slavic Assembly have always aligned them-
selves with President Lukashenka’s neo-Soviet regime that gave Ishiyama (1998) the
basis to argue that the extreme left and right cooperated in Belarus. In reality the
situation is more nuanced. The Belarusian nationalist right resembles what Ishiyama
(1998) describes as the anti-Russian nationalist wing of Ukrainian politics, because
Belarusian nationalists remain in opposition to the Lukashenka regime. Belarusian
and Ukrainian pan-Slavists have aligned themselves with the extreme left and other
pro-Russian politicians but pro-Western nationalists see Lukashenka’s support for
the union with Russia as a threat to Belarusian national independence. Shulman
(2005) and Leshchenko (2004, 2008) point to two competing nationalisms in Ukraine
and Belarus: ‘‘ethnic Slavic’’ in Ukraine and ‘‘Soviet’’ in Belarus pitted against
‘‘ethnic Ukrainian’’ and ‘‘Western nationalism’’ in Ukraine and Belarus respectively.
Shulman and Leshchenko concluded that the ‘‘ethnic Ukrainian’’ and ‘‘Western
nationalism’’ in Belarus supports domestic reform and pro-Western foreign policy
orientations, while ethnic Slavic and Soviet nationalisms in Ukraine and Belarus
respectively do not support democratic transitions or Euro-Atlantic integration.
Arel’s (2008) study of the inter-relationship between nationalism and the Orange
Revolution concluded that the road to democracy in Ukraine had become successful,
‘‘due to the strength of its nationalism.’’ Arel (2008) wrote that: ‘‘nationalism
produced the Orange Revolution’’ because civil society is stronger in regions with
a more consolidated national identity and because ‘‘Ukrainian nationalism’’ has
a far clearer vision of its goals. Kuzio (2006) believes that the Orange Revolution
represented the triumph of civic nationalism in Ukraine.
In Hungary there was a ‘‘rapid and almost painless’’ transition from Communist
to Socialist successor party where the Socialist party did not draw on nationalism.
Chen (2007) credits this to the weak fusion of Leninism and nationalism in Hungary,
the popularity of the Kadar regime and the presence of a strong reformist wing
within the Hungarian Communist party. Although considered one of the three fast
reformers in Central-Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic was unique in continuing
to have a successful Communist party in the post-Communist era: the Communist
Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM). Historically the Communist party had
roots in the urban industrial centers of the Czech lands that diﬀerentiated it from the
weak support for Communist parties imposed on rural Romania, Hungary and
Bulgaria by Soviet occupying armies towards the end of World War II. This historic
legacy of Communism in the Czech lands has been reﬂected in the high vote tradi-
tionally given to the KSCM. At 110,000 the KSCM’s membership is nearly the same
as that of the KPU (150,000), a country with a ﬁve times larger population. The
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vote respectively in the 2002 and 2006 Czech elections, and reaching second place in
the 2004 European Parliamentary elections. The Czech Social Democratic Party
(CSSD) had a long history stretching back into the late nineteenth century and has
no ties to the Leninist era Communist party other than that it was forcibly merged
with the Communist party in 1948. The CSSD was re-established in 1993 and has
been more popular than the KSCM with support of 30e32 percent during the 2002
and 2006 elections. The Czech Republic is, therefore, unique in having an electorally
successful Social Democratic party that is not a successor Communist party.
While hard-line successor Communist parties are in decline in the former USSR,
they remain resilient in the Czech Republic and are in the ascendency in Germany. In
addition to the Czech Republic, Germany also has a popular hard-line successor
Communist party. Die Linke (The Left), was formed in 2007 through a merger of the
Party of Democratic Socialism (the successor party to the Socialist Unity Party that
ruled the GDR from 1949 to 1990) and Labor and Social Justice e The Electoral
Alternative (WASG), a splinter group from the German Social Democrats (SPD).
Die Linke is the third largest political party in Germany in terms of members and the
fourth largest party in the Bundestag. With an ideology that lies to the left of the
SPD and is hostile to NATO and EU membership, it is a threat to the SPD’s post-
war domination of the left-wing of the German political spectrum. Die Linke’s
growing popularity is a reaction to the SPD’s evolution towards the political center
and the charisma of its leader, former senior SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine. In the
European Parliament, Die Linke and the KSCM are members of the European
United Left-Nordic Green Left political group with Die Linke the largest party in the
group.
Post-Communist transitions in Yugoslavia have been dominated by nationalist
parties that have either emerged as new political parties in the early 1990s, as in
Croatia, or worked through successor Communist parties, as in Serbia. During the
Communist era the nationalist opposition was not widespread in Yugoslavia outside
of Croatia, Slovenia and among Kosovar Albanians. Macedonian national identity
had been nurtured within Yugoslavia to deny Serbs and Bulgarians their traditional
claims on Macedonians as ‘‘Southern Serbs’’ or ‘‘Western Bulgarians’’ respectively
and Macedonians were therefore largely loyal Yugoslavs. Montenegro, like Belarus,
remained divided in its national identity between one portion that believes it is
‘‘Serb’’ and another that believes it is a diﬀerent people. As Pickering points out,
Croatia was diﬀerent from Central-Eastern Europe where nationalism had either
been co-opted by the Communist regime or separatism was surprisingly dormant, as
in Slovakia (Wolchik, 2007). This made the opposition in Croatia similar to that of
the national democratic oppositions in Ukraine, Georgia and the three Baltic
republics. Nationalism inevitably rose to the surface in Slovenia and Croatia in the
early 1990s, leading the way in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Slovenian nation-
alism had few national minorities to target (unlike the majority of other Yugoslav
republics) in its mono-ethnic state and nationalism rapidly evolved into a civic
variant. Croatian ethic nationalism resembled that in Georgia under President Zviad
Gamsakhurdia in the early 1990s, where civil wars led to frozen conﬂicts won by
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forcibly resolve its frozen conﬂict with its Serbian minority by militarily defeating the
Serbs and driving the minority out as a result of which Croatia became a mono-
ethnic state. Georgia’s two frozen conﬂicts were supported openly by Russia until
2007 who, following the August 2008 conﬂict in South Ossetia, recognised them as
independent states. The 2000 Croatian elections and 2003 Georgian Rose Revolu-
tions brought pro-Western oppositions to power by mobilizing voters by drawing on
civic nationalism amongst other factors.
Within Serbia the legacy of Leninism and nationalism is closer to that of Russia,
Romania and Bulgaria, but nevertheless has important nuances. Serbian support for
preserving the Yugoslav state was more important than agitating for increased
republican sovereignty because Yugoslavia was the only manner in which to preserve
the unity of Serbs living across diﬀerent republics. Josip Tito’s base of support came
from Serbs living outside Serbia in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian
nationalism, like its Russian counterpart in the USSR, therefore sought to preserve
the Yugoslav state against Croatian, Slovene and Kosovar Albanian demands for
greater sovereignty (Radan and Pavkovic, 1997; Miller, 1997; Pawlowitch, 2002).
During the 1990s in Croatia and Serbia democratic opposition parties found it
diﬃcult to criticize the policies of ruling nationalists (whether the Croatian Demo-
cratic Union [HDZ] in Croatia or the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in Serbia)
because to do so would have led to charges of lack of patriotism at a time of
domestic and inter-state conﬂict that was framed by ruling nationalist or nationalist-
socialist parties in terms of the survival of the state. During the 1990s the New
Democratic party (renamed Liberals of Serbia) and Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian
National Renewal (SPO) collaborated with the SPS in government and the SPO
refused to join the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition during the 2000
Serbian elections where Slobodan Milosevic was removed from power.
Pre-Soviet Social Democratic traditions that could be drawn upon are largely
absent from the majority of former Soviet republics with the exception of the three
Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia. In Ukraine a Socialist and Social Democratic
tradition emerged in both Russian and Austro-Hungarian ruled Ukraine in the
nineteenth century and center-left parties dominated the 1917e1921 independent
Ukrainian governments (except for the 1918 Conservative Hetmanate). Four
‘‘successor’’ parties to the Communist party in Ukraine (KPU, SPU, Peasant party
and Progressive Socialist party) polled a combined 40 percent of the vote in three
elections held between 1994 and 2002 and controlled the leadership of the 1994e1998
parliament. Of the two main successor parties the post-1993 KPU, with its base of
support in industrialized Eastern Ukraine, polled the most votes reaching its highest
support in the 2002 elections when it obtained 20 percent of the vote. The SPU,
drawing its support from Western and Central Ukraine, was unable to establish itself
as the main leftist successor to the Soviet era Communist party in Ukraine and its
highest voter support was 7 percent in the 2002 elections. Only in the 2006 elections
did the SPU overtake the KPU but this proved short-lived until pre-term elections
the following year when voters punished the SPU for defecting in July 2006 from the
Orange camp to join a parliamentary coalition with the Party of Regions and the
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Ukraine resembled that of the Romanian Communist successor party whose base of
support also remained rural.
Scholars should, therefore, carefully specify the type of nationalism that has
emerged in post-Communist states: civic, ethnic, Soviet or great power. Nationalism
per se is not antithetical to democratic transitions; indeed, civic nationalism has
assisted rapid reform in Central-Eastern Europe. In Central-Eastern Europe the
Communist legacy of nationalism fused with Leninism has slowed reforms and led to
the emergence of extreme right parties that have allied themselves to successor
Communist parties.
Political opposition
No scholarly study has compared and contrasted dissent and opposition in the
USSR with that in Communist Central-Eastern Europe. Studies of dissent and
opposition in Central-Eastern Europe tend to focus on successful opposition
movements, as in the Visegrad-3: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In the
majority of Central-Eastern European countries there was little or no dissent and
opposition, a factor which has led to a scarcity of counter-elites in the post-
Communist era. Where counter elites emerged following the collapse of Communism
in 1989e1990, they traditionally occupied the liberal and center-right niches of
political spectrums and were important in preventing the monopolization of power
by a post-Communist successor party. In Romania and Bulgaria the weakness of
counter elites postponed the coming to power by non-Communist forces until 1996
and 1997 respectively that, having achieved power, proved to be ineﬀectual.
In Bulgaria and Romania opposition to the Communist regime was to all intents
and purposes non-existent until the 1980s (Petrescu, 2004, p. 145). In Romania: ‘‘the
opposition never posed a genuine threat for the regime. Up to the very end of
Communist rule, it remained a small-scale phenomenon, comprising isolated nuclei
and poorly structured groups’’ (Petrescu, 2004, p. 153). An opposition only emerged
in Bulgaria in the Gorbachev era because the Communist regime in Bulgaria was,
‘‘strongly legitimate, for socio-economic, political, geopolitical, and cultural
reasons’’ (Petrova, 2004, p. 178). The Bulgarian Communist party was not seen as an
agent of Soviet imperialism but rather, ‘‘as a defender of national sovereignty’’
(Petrova, 2004, p. 178). Turkey (and to a lesser extent Greece and Yugoslavia) were
Bulgaria’s negative ‘‘Others’’, not Russia or the USSR. Communist support for
Bulgarian national myths (including treating Macedonians as wayward Bulgarians)
provided it with a degree of legitimacy and: ‘‘rendered dissent more diﬃcult, more
marginal, and more persecuted’’ (Petrova, 2004, p. 179). Economic discontent only
surfaced in the 1980s in Bulgaria as it did in other Communist states. Bulgaria was
unswervingly loyal to the USSR and, as Spirova has shown, beyond the Communist
party’s change of its name to the Socialist party did little to change its ideology until
after being defeated in the 1997 elections.
The weakness of the opposition in Bulgaria and Romania created diﬃculties for
the emergence of counter-elites in these two states in the post-Communist era.
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been no liberalization prior to the 1989 revolution (Tismaneanu, 1999). This made
the Romanian Communist party more ideologically orthodox than its Bulgarian or
Ukrainian counterparts. A Democratic Platform broke away from the Communist
party in Ukraine in 1989, transmuting into the pro-reform Party of Democratic
Revival of Ukraine in the 1990s. Following the 1989 collapse of Communist rule in
Central-Eastern Europe the former Communist party (or its informal networks) won
power in the ﬁrst free elections in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. Senior former
Communists in Romania were elected with 85 percent (Ion Iliescu) and in Ukraine
with 62 percent (Leonid Kravchuk) of the vote in the ﬁrst post-Communist presi-
dential elections. In second place, Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) leader
Vyacheslav Chornovil won twice as many votes (23 percent) as the Romanian
National Liberal Party leader Radu Campeanu (11 percent). Iliescu and the
successor Communist Party’s Front for National Salvation, that transmuted into the
Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR), and the PSD (Social Democratic
Party) dominated the majority of Romania’s transition from the 1989 revolution to
membership of the EU in 2007. Unstable non-Communist coalitions came to power
in 1996 (Democratic Convention [CDR]) and in 2004 (Truth and Justice Alliance
[ADA]) with the latter victory drawing on Ukraine in a ‘‘mini Orange Revolution’’
(Ciobanu, 2007, p. 1440). Larger support for reform in Romania’s Transylvania
which backed the 1989 Romanian revolution and in Ukraine’s Galicia which
propelled Ukraine’s drive to independence and the Orange Revolution was a product
of historic association with the Austro-Hungarian empire (Roper and Fesnic, 2003).
The instability of the Truth and Justice Alliance (composed of the Democratic
Union of Hungarians in Romania, Democratic, National Liberal and Humanist
[Conservative] Parties) resembled that of unstable Orange coalitions following
Yushchenko’s 2005 election and Ukraine’s 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections,
both won by Orange parties, and 2008 pre-term election. The Ceausescu legacy made
Romania’s transition the most diﬃcult in Central-Eastern Europe outside Yugo-
slavia and, ‘‘reforms were largely undertaken under the pressure of the EU deadline
.’’ (Ciobanu, 2007, p. 1442; Pridham, 2007). No similar EU membership ‘carrot’
has been made available to Ukraine or Georgia.
Until the 2001 elections the BSP and Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) won
diﬀerent elections in a periodof great instability inBulgaria.As a broadanti-Communist
coalition the SDS resembled popular fronts in the formerUSSR, such asRukhorViktor
Yushchenko’s OurUkraine bloc. The non-left opposition only came to power in 1996 in
Romania (Romanian Democratic Convention or CDR) and in 1997 in Bulgaria (SDS).
In Romania the CDR’s performance was ‘‘rather ineﬀectual’’ (Pridham, 2007, p. 240).
The 1997 protests and electoral defeat of the BSP by a wide margin (22 percent to the
SDS’s 52 percent) came as a particularly profound shock to Bulgaria’s successor
Communist party. The loss of power in 1996e1997, forced the successor Communist
parties in Bulgaria and Romania to move from status quo policies towards social
democracy, acceptance of the market economy and support for Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Such transformation of successor parties on Ukraine’s left have largely not taken
place with only the SPU moving some way towards acceptance of a market economy.
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with Poland in the Visegrad Group, both had weak oppositions. In Hungary the
leftist opposition was loyal and argued for reform within the Communist system.
The Hungarian Communist regime permitted the inculcation of a passive acceptance
of the status quo among its population in exchange for consumerism. The Czech
republic had a ‘‘weak and fragmented democratic opposition’’ (Glenn, 2001, p. 130)
and there was little in the way of alternatives to the Communist regime. By 1989 the
Charter 77 movement had only 1886 signatories (Tuma, 2004). It refused to support
organized political activity and was repressed until the 1989 Velvet Revolution. The
Helsinki Groups established in the former USSR (with the Ukrainian and Lithua-
nian groups the largest in membership) never viewed themselves as opposition
groups but instead as monitors of the upholding of human rights and international
commitments by Communist regimes. In Czechoslovakia reform Communism had
died in the 1968 Prague Spring after which some 200,000 individuals were purged
from the Communist party and other state structures. In 1989 Civic Forum therefore
had few counter elites available as negotiating partners within the Communist
regime and a united opposition only emerged during and after the Velvet Revolu-
tion. Charter 77 had little support in the Slovak republic and during the Velvet
Revolution the Public Against Violence was established as the Slovak equivalent of
Civic Forum. Slovakia would have to wait until 1998 for its ‘‘Bratislava Spring’’
when a democratic coalition won power (Butora, 2007); nevertheless, it was not until
the 2002 elections, ‘‘that Slovakia’s nationalist-authoritarian experiment is eﬀectively
over’’ (Krause Deegan, 2003, p. 65). Between 1991 and 2002 Vladimir Meciar’s
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won the highest number of votes in
Slovakia.
In Croatia, as in some of the non-Russian Soviet republics, dissenters pursued
democratic and national questions, such as defending language, culture and
republican sovereignty (Spehnjak, 2004, p. 191). Reform Communists, including the
Liberal Marxist Praxis group, did exist within the Croatian League of Communists
and Croatia underwent its ‘‘spring’’ liberalization in 1966e1974 during the same
period as Czechoslovakia and Ukraine. The stagnation and repression that followed
Croatia’s ‘‘Spring’’ in 1974 was comparable to that following the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and removal of Ukraine’s Communist party
leader, Petro Shelest, in 1972. Croatia and Ukraine were the targets of extensive
security service intelligence work by the Yugoslav and Soviet secret services
respectively because of the sensitivity of their separatist nationalism to the continued
viability of the Yugoslav and Soviet multi-national states. Nevertheless, repression
of Ukrainian nationalists was more severe in the totalitarian USSR than that of
Croatian nationalists in authoritarian Yugoslavia.
In Ukraine nationalist parties akin to those in Croatia never acquired electoral
popularity. Franjo Tudman’s center-right HDZ dominated the country’s politics
from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Croatian independence in the early 1990s
until his death in 1999 and its election defeat the following year. The HDZ returned
to power in 2003 as a mainstream center-right party that mirrored the evolution of
pro-fascist forces in Spain into the center-right Popular Alliance (later Peoples Party)
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the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Social Democratic Party (SPH), was
unable to win elections until entering government in an opposition coalition in 2000
with the presidency going to the small populist Peoples Party (HNS). As the
successor Communist party, the SPH was unable to come to power until after the
conclusion of conﬂict with Serbia, the death of Tudman, decline in popularity of the
HDZ and a popular electoral mobilization that targeted corruption and abuse of
oﬃce by a ruling party that had been in power for the last decade (Ottaway, 2003). In
Serbia the successor to the Serbian section of the League of Communists of Yugo-
slavia, the SPS, merged with the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia.
The SPS contested elections in coalitions with the Yugoslav Left, a party led by
Milosˇevic´’s wife, and the nationalist Radical Party. The SPS dominated politics until
the 2000 democratic revolution that brought the unwieldy DOS coalition to power,
Milosevic´’s arrest a year later and his transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. Since the 2003 elections the Radical Party has attracted
many former SPS voters to win a third of the vote in the 2003, 2007 and 2008
elections and its leader, Vojislav Seselj, obtaining 48 percent support in the 2008
presidential elections. In 2007 the Party of Serbian Unity led by murdered war lord
Zeljko Raznatovic (‘Arkan’) merged with the SRS.
Within the seven Soviet republics where civil society and dissent existed (Russia,
Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia and Georgia) there was a clear division
between liberal dissenters inRussia and national democratic, that is, seeking both national
and democratic rights, oppositions in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia.
Russian nationalists seeking the independence of the Russian SFSR from the USSR
were in aminority andRussian liberal dissidents instead sought the democratization of the
USSR4 (Motyl, 1990, pp. 161e173).The lackofRussian separatism in theUSSRmirrored
that of the weakness of Serbian separatist nationalism in Yugoslavia (Slovakia was
an unusual exception of low support for separatism in Czechoslovakia). Russian nation-
alist dissidents who sought to preserve the USSR in the same manner as their Serbian
counterparts in Yugoslavia were either co-opted by the Soviet regime or a small minority
went into opposition to the Soviet regime because the Soviet state was not seen by them
as ‘Russian’ enough. The non-existence of a national democratic constituency in Russia
was evident in two ways. First, the Russian SFSR was the only Soviet republic not to
declare independence fromtheUSSRafter the failedAugust 1991 coupd’e´tat.5 Second, the
post-Communist leadership of Russia ignored nation building and focused on a demo-
craticandmarket economic transitionwhile ignoring the forgingofa civicnational identity
for the independent Russian state. Russia did not follow Ukraine in launching
a ‘‘quadruple transition’’ of state and nation building, democratic and economic reform
(Kuzio, 2001) and it was left to Putin to focus on Russian nation building but within an
autocratic regime by drawing on great power (rather than civic) nationalism.4 Russian dissidents Andrei Amalrik and Vladimir Bukovsky were some of the lone Russian dissident
advocates of Russian independence and the disintegration of the USSR. (Amalrik, 1970).
5 Russia’s annual ‘Independence Day’ is based on its June 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty.
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Lithuania and Ukraine diverged in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods when
Lithuania’s Communist party evolved along similar lines as Poland’s United Workers
Party. Counter elites in Ukraine were instrumental in dividing the Communist party in
Ukraine in the last years of the USSR into three wings: democratic platform,
‘‘sovereign’’ (national) and ‘‘imperial’’ Communists. Only the ﬁrst two groups sup-
ported sovereignty and independence (Kuzio, 2000, 2007). Ukraine’s counter elites
had to wait until the 2004 Orange Revolution before they could come to power when
Yushchenko was elected (Wilson, 2005). In Lithuania the Communist party rapidly
transformed itself into a Social Democratic party supporting Lithuania’s indepen-
dence, a transition to a market economy and Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine’s
transition was hijacked by post-Communist ideologically vacuous ‘‘centrist’’ parties
created by former senior Communist party nomenklatura. The transitions in Romania
and Bulgaria were also hijacked but by Communist successor parties. During the
1990s former senior Ukrainian communist nomenklatura transformed their pre-1991
political power into economic power and then back into vacuous ‘‘centrist’’ parties
following the 1998 parliamentary elections. The ideological disintegration of
Communist ideology during the Leonid Brezhnev’s ‘‘era of stagnation’’ became
evident when only 5 percent (150,000 out of 3.5 million) of Ukraine’s pre-1991
Communists re-joined the post-1993 KPU. In Georgia counter elites came to power in
two waves: ethnic nationalist in 1991 and national democratic during the 2003 Rose
Revolution, leaving an 11 year interregnum where Georgia was ruled by former
Georgian Communist First Secretary and Soviet Foreign Aﬀairs Minister She-
vardnazde through a similar ideologically vacuous ‘‘centrist’’ party.
Poland stands out as unique in terms of the mass opposition that emerged in 1980e
1981 led by the Solidarity movement. A mass underground civil society and opposi-
tion movement that continued to function and evolve under martial law (1981e1983)
and Communist rule until the 1989 round-table negotiations and victory of Solidarity
in elections held that year. Poland was doubly unique in experiencing the only example
of widespread cooperation of the intelligentsia and the workers after 1976 when KOR
(Committee in Defence ofWorkers) was formed that gave the opposition a mass base.
No other Central-Eastern European country approached Poland’s level of mass
opposition. The widespread opposition provided Poland with large counter-elite that
could take power early and lead the country’s transition from Communism. A large
Polish counter-elite ensured a pacted transition between regime and ‘‘constructive
opposition’’ moderates (Jacek Kuron, AdamMichnik and others) who demanded the
legalization of Solidarity, a transition to a market economy and free elections. The
hardliner radical nationalists and anti-Communist oppositionists in the Confedera-
tion for an Independent Poland (KPN), Fighting Solidarity and Young Poland
opposed negotiations with the Communist regime (Glenn, 2001, p. 70e101).
There are four reasons why Poland was unique in Central-Eastern Europe and
Eurasia. First, the rise of Solidarity was built on earlier waves of worker and
intellectual opposition to the Communist regime in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976
(Ackerman and Duvall, 2000). Second, Communism in Poland was never seen as
indigenous but rather as a system that had been implanted from abroad by Poland’s
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diﬃcult to achieve popular legitimacy which was seen as a threat to Polish sover-
eignty (Zarycki, 2004; Prizel, 1998, p. 130).
Third, Soviet leader Jozef Stalin included in the 1945 Yalta agreement a forced
resolution of Poland’s historically diﬃcult relationship with its neighbors and
national minorities. Attitudes towards Poland’s occupying powers had divided Poles
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with two political thinkers and leaders
stressing the German threat (Roman Dmowski) or the threat from Russia (Jozef
Pilsudski). The Polish successor Communist party was especially popular in the
‘‘recovered territories’’ taken from Germany in the north and west of Poland
(Szczerbiak, 2003, p. 73). Following World War II these political divisions eventually
disappeared after the German threat was resolved following the 1970 and 1990
PolisheGerman treaties that recognized the post-1945 border. Polish Communist
leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, unsuccessfully attempted to synthesize Leninism and
Dmowski’s national democratic ideology whereby Germany, ‘‘was Poland’s natural
enemy and hence Russia was Poland’s natural ally’’ (Curp, 2001, p. 588). As a near
mono-ethnic state, nationalism in post-war Poland no longer had internal ‘‘enemies’’
(with the exception of regime sponsored anti-Semitism in 1968) and irredentism was
no longer a possibility (Snyder, 1998, p. 5). The leading Polish e´migre´ journal Kul-
tura and the Solidarity opposition and successor movements and parties in the 1980s
called for rapprochement with Poland’s Eastern neighbors (Kuzio, 1987). Post-war
Polish nationalism accepted Ukrainian independence,6 normalized relations with
Germany and recognized current borders (Prizel, 1998, p. 105). National minorities
in inter-war Poland made up a third of the population and attempts at assimilating
them had led to heightened anti-Polish nationalism among the German and
Ukrainian minorities (Brubaker, 1996).
Fourth, in comparison to other Communist regimes the Polish Catholic Church
had never been suppressed and retained a great deal of autonomy through organi-
zations such as Pax and the journalsWiez and Znak. The election of a Polish Pope in
1979 only served to strengthen the anti-Communist opposition by adding religion to
the already potent mix of worker and intellectual opposition in Poland. ‘‘During the
time of martial law the Roman Catholic Church served as a shelter for the various
fragmented dissenting groups’’ (Sonntag, 2004, p. 18).
Six factors transformed the Polish opposition into a mass movement and provided
a wide base for the emergence of counter elites. These six factors taken together did
not exist in other Communist Central-Eastern European or Eurasian countries.
First, no other Central-Eastern European or Eurasian country had a similar history
of uprisings against Communist rule. The GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had
uprisings in 1953, 1956 and 1968 respectively, but these were brutally crushed by
foreign forces that were either stationed inside the country or brought in from outside.
In Western Ukraine and the three Baltic state’s anti-Communist partisans seeking6 In the inter-war period Ukrainians and Belarusians in Poland were still seen as ethnographic raw
material available for assimilation into the Polish nation.
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with some exceptions, dissenters used non-violent methods.
Second, a cross-party consensus on Russia and the USSR as the ’’Other’’ existed
only in Poland, the three Baltic states, Romania, Hungary and Western Ukraine. In
Czechoslovakia the country’s traditional Russophile orientation was only dented
after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion. In Bulgaria traditional russophilism remained
in place until the end of Communist rule and continued into the 1990s until the
Socialist Party lost the 1997 elections. Romania and Hungary adopted diametrically
opposite strategies in their domestic and foreign policies. Romania sought foreign
policy independence while the regime pursued a rigid national-Stalinism at home.
Hungary maintained a foreign policy loyalty to the USSR while being permitted
domestic ideological ﬂexibility.
Third, aside from Poland a robust civil society and opposition was present in only
a small number of Central-Eastern European states and dissent barely existed in the
Slovak region of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania and Bulgaria. Dissent and
opposition was not widespread in Yugoslavia outside of Croatia and Slovenia. Civil
society and dissent in the former USSR was limited to seven of the 15 Soviet
republics: Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and the three Baltic states while the
ﬁve Central Asian republics, Belarus, Moldova and Azerbaijan remained largely
placid. Alexeyeva’s (1985) monumental study of Soviet dissent includes chapters on
Russia, Ukraine, the three Baltic states, Georgia and Armenia. Of the Soviet
republics with national democratic dissident movements, Lithuania and Ukraine
produced the largest proportion of prisoners of conscience that were larger in size
and diversity than the fractured or non-existent opposition groups in Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
Fourth, an alliance between workers and intellectuals never emerged outside of
Poland (Petrescu, 2004, p. 153). Attempts at establishing cooperative ties between
dissidents and ﬂedging independent trade unions emulating Poland’s KOR were
attempted in the USSR, including the most ambitious in Ukraine’s Donetsk, but
they largely failed (Teague, 1988).
Fifth is religion. Catholic and Protestant Churches played more important roles in
nurturing opposition movements than Orthodox Churches. In contrast to Poland,
Lithuania and Western Ukraine, where Catholic religious dissent was an important
element in their opposition movements, religious dissent was absent from Bulgaria
and Romania where the Orthodox Church accommodated itself to the regime and
did not protest against repression (Turcescu, 2000). Protestant Churches in the
GDR, Estonia and Latvia and Catholic Churches in Poland, Lithuania, Western
Ukraine, Hungary and Croatia provided either an underground nexus for the
opposition where the Church was banned (as in the USSR) or an autonomous space
outside Communist control in Central-Eastern Europe where the Church was legal
but nevertheless state controlled (Spehnjak, 2004, p. 186). In Romania, Bulgaria,
Serbia and Russia the Orthodox Church was co-opted by the state and Orthodox
religious nationalism merged with that of the ruling regimes national Communism.
Sixth, national minorities played an important role in supporting democratiza-
tion in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria (Mihailescu, 2008). In Latvia and Estonia
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the ethnic citizenship legislation in place. In Lithuania national minorities were
smaller in number and eventually supported the country’s Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Hungarian minority coalitions in Slovakia (Coexistence movement, Hungarian
Christian Democratic Movement and the Hungarian Civic Party) and Romania
(Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]) and the Turkish
minority coalition in Bulgaria (Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]) sup-
ported parliamentary coalitions with pro-Western reformers. In Georgia national
minorities largely live outside Tbilisi’s control in two enclaves (Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) as de facto Russian protectorates. In Ukraine the Russian ethnic minority
and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, who together dominated Eastern and Southern
Ukraine, have traditionally voted for the left or ‘‘centrist’’ parties in the 1990s or the
Party of Regions in 2006 and 2007 and they were less supportive than Ukrainia-
nophones of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Low popular support for NATO
membership in Russophone Eastern and Southern Ukraine is a serious obstacle for
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Conclusion
This article has built on Ishiyama’s (1998) framework of the transformation of
Central-Eastern European and Eurasian Communist parties into successor parties
and argues that this transformation has followed four diﬀerent trajectories (see
Appendix A). The diversity is a product of pre-Communist historical legacies, the
nature of the Communist regime, the type of nationalism and presence of national
minorities, the presence of an anti-regime opposition under Communism and the
inﬂuence of the EU in oﬀering membership inducements that has encouraged
democratization. Communist parties successfully transmuted into center-left parties
in the rapid reformers of Central-Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Czech
Republic and former GDR. Communist parties eventually transmuted into
successful center-left parties in the Central-Eastern European Semi-Democratic
reform laggards but they failed to establish themselves as a popular political force in
Ukraine and Georgia. Throughout the CIS pre-1991 Communist parties have
remained ideologically orthodox while the majority of senior former Communist
nomenklatura oﬃcials have created vacuous ‘‘centrist’’ parties to represent their
regional, clan and new business interests. In Russia the KPRF has fused nationalism
and Communism into a great power nationalism but this failed to generate electoral
majorities or presidents. In Russia, Serbia and Romania, Communist successor
parties have aligned themselves with the extreme right that have led to electoral
victories. In all three countries, nationalism and Leninism were fused during the
Communist era that led to high popularity for extreme right nationalist parties and
nationalist presidential candidates in the post-communist era. Where civic nation-
alism dominated post-Communist transitions, rather than ethnic, Soviet, and great
power nationalisms, successful democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration was
the outcome. Ethnic, Soviet and great power nationalisms generated ethnic conﬂict
and post-conﬂict stagnation and autocratic regimes.
Appendix A. Diversity of successor Communist parties in Central-Eastern Europe and
Eurasia
Table A.1
Seven factors Central-Eastern
European
democracies (rapid
reformers): Poland,
Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovenia,
3 Baltic states
Central-Eastern
European semi-
democracies (reform
laggards): Romania,
Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Croatia, Albania,
Ukraine, Georgia
Post-Imperial pseudo-
democracies/autocracies
(reform obstructionists):
Russia, Serbia
Eurasian
Autocracies
(Reform Stiﬂers):
Belarus,
Armenia,
Azerbaijan, 5
Central Asia
states
Transition Democratic and
national
transitions
simultaneous
Double national and
democratic
transition
Hijacked transition by
oligarchs and
nationalist-socialists
Limited
transition
Nationalism Dominance of civic
nationalism
Nationalism co-
opted by communist
regime in Romania
and Bulgaria.
Evolution from
ethnic to civic
nationalism
Nationalism co-opted
by communist regime.
Ethnic and great power
nationalism remains
more popular than civic
nationalism
Statist
nationalism
dominant, except
Soviet
nationalism in
Belarus
Successor
Party
Rapid
transmutation of
Communist to
Socialist Party
Transmutation of
Communist to
Socialist Parties
Unreformed Communist
Party (Russia) and
Socialist Party (Serbia).
Dominance of ‘centrist’
parties in Russia
Unreformed
Communist
Parties and
dominance of
‘centrist’ parties
Nationalist
parties
Nationalist
successor parties
weak
Successful
nationalist successor
parties in Romania,
Slovakia and
Croatia
Successful nationalist
successor parties
Nationalist
successor parties
weak
National
minorities
National
minorities absent
except in three
Baltic states.
Absence of anti-
minority policies
Anti-national
minority policies
introduced in
Croatia, Hungary,
Romania, and
Georgia
Anti-national minority
policies in Yugoslavia
and Russia’s Chechnya
region
National
minorities not
targeted
Dissidents
and
opposition
Large anti-regime
dissident and
opposition
movements, except
in Hungary
Weak or no
dissidents and
counter elites, except
where demands for
national and
democratic rights are
united in Croatia,
Ukraine and
Georgia
Liberal dissidents do not
call for Russian or
Serbian secession from
the USSR and
Yugoslavia
Weak or non-
existent
opposition
movements
Foreign
policy
Strongest and
earliest evolution
of communist
successor parties to
pro-NATO and
EU positions
Long evolution by
successor parties to
pro-NATO positions
Preference for
integration in the CIS
and disinterest in NATO
and the EU (Russia) and
support for integration
into the EU (Serbia)
Preference for
integration in the
CIS and
disinterest in
NATO and the
EU
Appendix B. Acronyms of political parties
Party of Belarusian Communists (PKB)
Communist Party of Belarus (KPB)
Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Bulgaria
National Union Attack (NSA), Bulgaria
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), Bulgaria
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), Czech Republic
Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)
Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM)
KOR (Committee in Defence of Workers), Poland
Polish United Workers Party (PZPR)
National Salvation Front (FSN)
Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR)
PSD (Social Democratic Party), Romania
Democratic Convention [CDR], Romania
Greater Romanian Party (PRM)
Truth and Justice Alliance [ADA], Romania
Romanian Party of National Unity (PUNR)
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
Serbian National Renewal (SPO)
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)
Serbian Socialist Party (SPS)
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)
Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU),
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU),
People’s Democratic Party (NDP), Ukraine
Peasant Party, Ukraine
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